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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 
The appellants brought this action seeking the lower court's 
declaration that §§ 15-18-3, 15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8, 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, violate the laws and 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United 
States, and further seeking the lower court's order permanently enjoin-
ing the enforcement of said sections. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Having reviewed the parties' joint motion for summary judgment, 
stipulated facts and respective memoranda of points and authorities, the 
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Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
rendered its Memorandum Decision denying appellants' motion for summary 
judgment and granting respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the lower court's Memorandum Decision 
reversed, appellants' motion for summary judgment granted, §§ 15-18-3, 
15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County declared unlawful and unconstitutional, and the enforcement 
of said sections permanently enjoined. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, on November 
20, 1978, enacted Title 15, Chapter 18 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County (ROSLCO), 1966, as amended (hereinafter "massage ordinance"), 
which ordinance was to become effective on December 6, 1978. The appel-
lants, being real parties in interest as unincorporated business 
entities under the laws of the State of Utah whose rights and legal 
relations were affected by the newly enacted massage ordinance, filed a 
complaint with the lower court on December 5, 1978, seeking that court's 
declaration that §§ 15-18-3, 15-18-4, 15-18-5, 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of 
the massage ordinance violate the laws and Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the Constitution of the United States, and further seeking that 
court's order permanently enjoining the enforcement of said sections. 
Additionally, on December 5, 1978, appellants filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order, which motion was granted, and an order 
temporarily enjoining and restraining respondents from enforcing the 
2 
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massage ordinance issued on the same date, upon the signature of the 
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge. On December 14, 1978, the parties stipu-
lated to the continuance of the temporary restraining order, as it 
applied to § 15-18-5(1) and (2) of the massage ordinance, and agreed to 
present arguments on the issues of law raised by appellants' complaint 
by means of a joint motion for summary judgment, and further agreed to 
stipulated facts for purposes of summary judgment. Oral arguments were 
presented before the trial court on August 27, 1979, supplemented by 
extensive memoranda. The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision 
under the pen of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding Judge, 
which decision denied appellants' motion for summary judgment and 
granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and which decision set 
aside the restraining order effective December 19, 1979j at 5:00 P.M .. 
Appellants filed their notice of appeal, certificate, designation of 
record on appeal and appeal bond with the lower court on December 19, 
1979.. Additionally, on December 19, 1979, appellants filed with this 
Court a motion seeking the restoration of the restraining order for the 
pendency of the appeal. On December 21, 1979, counsel for both parties 
met with the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins in chambers for the purpose of 
presenting informal arguments relative to whether the restraining order 
should be restored for the interim period prior to this Court's ruling 
on appellants' motion. An order issued that day restraining respondents 
from enforcing § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance, said order to run 
until January 7, 1980. A hearing was had on appellants' motion before 
this Court on January 7, 1980, and based upon the parties' oral argu-
ments and appellants' memorandum, appellants' motion was granted and the 
restraining order, as it applied to § 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordi-
nance, was restored for the pendency of the appeal. 
3 
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The sections of the massage ordinance challenged herein or other-
wise referred to read as follows: 
Sec. 15-18-1. Definitions. 
chapter the following terms 
prescribed: 
For the purpose of this 
shall have the meanings 
(2) ''Masseur" shall mean any person who 
gives massages for hire; provided that any person 
who is duly licensed by the Department of Regis-
tration to practice the healing arts shall not be 
included in this definition. 
(4) "Employee" means the operator, owner, or 
manager of a massage establishment and any person 
performing massages at or on the premises of a 
massage establishment and also any agent or inde-
pendent contractor who gives massages at a massage 
establishment. 
Sec. 15-18-3. 
cense. Each 
ment license 
individual at 
Requirements for the Issuance of a Li-
individual desiring a massage establish-
er a masseur license shall: (1) Be an 
least 21 years of age. 
Sec. 15-18-4. Sanitary Premises. All applications for 
a massage establishment license shall be referred to 
the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health for investi-
gation and a license shall be granted only after a 
finding by the Salt Lake City-County Board of Heal th 
that the proposed premises are sanitary enough to 
conduct business therein without jeopardizing the 
public health. 
Sec. 15-18-5. Prohibited Acts. The following acts are 
prohibited: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to 
administer, for hire, to any person of the oppo-
site sex, a massage, a fomentation, or a bath. It 
shall be unlawful for any massage establishment to 
cause or permit in or about his place of business, 
an employee to administer a massage upon any per-
son of the opposite sex. This section shall not 
apply to any treatment administered by any person 
licensed to practice a healing art or profession 
under the provisions of Utah code Annotated, 1953, 
or any other law of this state. 
(2) It shall be unlawful to serve, to store, 
or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic beverages 
on the licensed premises of a massage establish-
ment. 
4 
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(3) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to 
touch or offer to touch or massage the genitalia 
of customers. 
Sec. 15-18-7. Civil Sanctions. Any unlawful conduct, 
whether the omission to perform an act required by this 
ordinance, or the performance of an act prohibited by 
this ordinance, shall be cause for revocation or suspen-
sion of a massage establishment's license or masseur's 
license. The holder of a massage establishment license 
may have his or her license revoked or suspended for 
any and all violations of the provisions of this ordi-
nance committed by his or her employees. 
Sec. 15-18-8. Penal Sanctions. The person convicted 
of violations of this chapter of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake County may be fined not to exceed $299.00, 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail not to exceed 
six months, or both. 
ARGUMENT 
The massage ordinance challenged ·herein represents Salt Lake 
County's most recent attempt at reaching the criminal offense of prosti-
tution through enactment of an ordinance designed to suppress and pro-
hibi t the legitimate business of massage parlors. The County's prior 
efforts of this sort have been struck down as being "vague and uncer-
tain," "not subject to regulation by the County," and "not a proper 
exercise of the police power," Jensen v. Salt Lake County, 530 P. 2d 3 
(Utah 1974); "creating irrational differentiations," "punishing mas-
seurs without trial and conviction," and as "arbitrary and unreason-
able," Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah 1978)e 
The appellants contend that the newly enacted massage ordinance 
again suffers from the above-cited defects and other impairing defects, 
making said ordinance invalid and unenforceable, more specifically set 
out as follows: 
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POINT I 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
EXCEEDED ITS DELEGATED SCOPE OF AUTHORITY IN ENACTING 
§ 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE AND SAID SECTION IS 
THEREFORE INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
A. SECTION 17-5-27, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953), AS AMENDED, DELEGATES COUNTIES THE 
AUTHORITY TO LICENSE MASSAGE PARLOR BUSI-
NESSES SOLELY, FOR PURPOSES OF REGULATION 
AND REVENUE -- NOT FOR PURPOSES OF SUPPRES-
SION AND PROHIBITION. 
The underlying purpose and objective of the Salt Lake County Commis-
sion's enactment of §§ 15-18-5(1), 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the massage 
ordinance, which sections make the administration of a massage by a 
licensed masseur or masseuse upon any person of the opposite sex unlaw-
ful and subject to civil and penal sanctions, is to reach the criminal 
offense of prostitution through the suppression and prohibition of mas-
sage parlor businesses. 
It is contended by respondents that two statutory grants of author-
ity, § 17-5-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended (UCA), discussed 
herein, and § 17-5-77, UCA, discussed infra at Point I-B, authorize the 
County to enact the massage ordinance in question. The appellants con-
tend, however, that the County has significantly exceeded these dele-
gated grants of authority. 
Section 17-5-27, UCA, provides in relevant part as follows: 
License business for regulation and revenue -- They 
(County Commissioners) may license for purposes of regu-
lation and revenue all and every kind of business not pro-
hibited by law • . • they may license, tax, regulate, sup-
press and prohibit billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or 
any other tables or implements kept or used for similar 
purposes, also pin alleys or tables, and ball alleys, 
dancing halls • . (Emphasis added.) 
While it is clear from the above statute, and appellants so concede, 
that the County may license the business of massage parlors, just as it 
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may license "all and every kind of business, n it is equally clear that 
the County's licensing authority is statutorily limited, not absolute. 
Under the doctrine of statutory construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one matter excludes all other 
similar matters not mentioned. Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 445 P.2d 990 (Utah 1968); Great Salt Lake Authority 
v. Island Ranching Coo, 414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966); and Hansen v. Board 
of Education of Emery County School, 116 P.2d 936 (Utah 1941). Thus, 
properly construed, § 17-5-27 delegates the County authority to use its 
licensing power, in the case of businesses in general, for purposes of 
"regulation and revenue" and, in the case of those businesses expressly 
named (~, "billiard, bagatelle .• e ")' for the additional purposes 
of "suppression and prohibition." Since massage parlors are not in-
cluded among those businesses expressly named, massage parlors can be 
licensed only for the purposes of regulation and revenue: the County is 
without authority to suppress and prohibit. 
The appellants submit that § 15-18-5 (1) of the massage ordinance 
goes beyond the area of regulation into the areas of suppression and 
prohibition. As has been stipulated to, there are approximately 140 
licensed masseurs in Salt Lake County, of which approximately 130 are 
women, and the vast majority of massage parlor patrons are men. (See, 
Stipulated Facts, nos. 6 and 7.) Given the opposite sex massage prohibi-
tion of § 15-18-5(1), combined with the sanctions of §§ 15-18-7 and 15-
18-8, nearly 95% of the massage parlors and masseurs will be driven out 
of business as a direct result of the massage ordinance. This is sup-
pression and prohibition, not regulation. 
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A case analogous to the instant case in that it, too, raises the 
significant distinction between regulation and prohibition is Combined 
Communications Corporation v. City and County of Denver, 542 p 0 2d 79 
(Co 1 o • 19 7 5) • There, the Supreme Court of Colorado had occasion to 
examine a city ordinance prohibiting erection of new outdoor advertising 
and, in that case, as in the instant case, the city's grant of authority 
spoke only of regulation and not of prohibition. The court stated: 
Under a concept of reasonableness, the charter auth-
orization of regulation does not permit (the munici-
pality) to prohibit this entire industry. At 
542 P.2d 83. 
The court, citing authorities, went on to hold: 
that the power to regulate does not include 
'any power, express of inherent, to prohibit.' At 
542 P.2d 84. (Emphasis added.) 
The holding in Combined Communications Corporation, supra, is con-
sistent with Winther v. Village of Weippe, 430 P. 2d 689 (Idaho 196 7), 
wherein the Supreme Court of Idaho stated the general rule as to munici-
palities' authority to license and regulate: 
It is the general rule that where authority to 
license and regulate a business is granted by the 
legislature to a municipality, the regulations 
adopted must not be unreasonable, unjust or unduly 
oppressive (citations omitted) E.£E. • • • such as to 
be prohibitory (citations omitted)o At 430 P.2d 
695. (Emphasis added.) 
In sum, although § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance is couched 
in the disguising language of a licensing mechanism, the true purpose is 
to reach the criminal offense of prostitution through the suppression 
and prohibition of the legitimate business of massage parlors, and ap-
pellants submit, based on the general principles of statutory con-
struction and the above-cited authorities, that the County in enacting 
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§ 15-18-5(1) has exceeded its delegated scope of authority under § 17-5-
27, UCA, and said section must be found invalid and unenforceable. 
B. SECTION 17-5-77, UCA, DELEGATES COUNTIES 
THE AUTHORITY TO USE THE POLICE POWER TO 
IMPROVE MORALS, PEACE AND GOOD ORDER --
BUT ONLY WHERE "NECESSARY AND PROPER" AND 
§ 15-18-5 (1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS 
NEITHER NECESSARY NOR PROPER. 
In addition to the grant of authority claimed under§ 17-5-27, dis-
cussed supra, the County contends that the general police power dele-
gated under § 17-5-77 authorizes the County's enactment of § 15-18-5(1) 
of the massage ordinance. The appellants contend, however, that the use 
of the police power is statutorily limited to situations where such use 
is necessary and proper and that § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance 
is neither necessary nor proper. 
Section 17-5-77, UCA, provides in relevant part as follows: 
Ordinances -- Power to enact -- Penalty for violation 
The board of county commissioners may pass all ordinances 
and rules and make all regulations, not repugnant to 
law, • such as are necessary and proper to . . . im-
prove the morals, peace and good order . . • of the 
county and inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
(i) SECTION 15-8-5(1) IS NOT NECESSARY. 
As was stated supra at Point I-A, the underlying purpose and objec-
tive of the opposite sex massage prohibition of § 15-18-5(1), although 
couched in terms of a licensing ordinance, is to reach the criminal 
offense of prostitution. The appellants submit that no additional ordi-
nance is necessary to proscribe prostitution specifically or illicit 
sexual activity in general. 
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The area of prostitution is comprehensively covered by the Utah 
Criminal Code: § 76-l~-1302, "Prostitution;" § 76-10-1303, "Patroniz-
ing a Prostitute;" § 76-10-1304, "Aiding a Prostitute;" § 76-10-1305, 
"Exploiting Prostitution;" and § 76-10-1306, "Aggravated Exploitation 
of Prostitution." Additionally, the Utah Criminal code covers other 
illicit sexual activity: § 
§ 76-5-403, · "Sodomy;" and § 
76-5-401, 
76-5-404, 
"Unlawful Sexual Intercourse;" 
"Forcible Sexual Abuse." The 
Salt Lake County Ordinances cover prostitution as well, at § 16-23-3, 
and general sexual offenses, at § 16-23-1, et seq. 
The above offenses, in addition to fin es, carry penal ties ranging 
from imprisonment terms of 0 to 6 months to imprisonment terms of not 
less than 1 nor more than 15 years. 
These statutes and ordinances, if appropriately enforced, are more 
than adequate to control prostitution, and no additional proscription of 
prostitution is necessary. The respondents' contention to the contrary, 
that the opposite sex massage prohibition of § 15-18-5 (1) is necessary 
to combat pros tu ti on because the above-cited laws are ineffective, is 
!otally without merit. In this regard, the suggestion by Captain 
Morgan, (~, Stipulated Facts) that it "takes much more time as far as 
investigation is concerned than is justified by the outcome," speaks 
much more to the ineffectiveness of the investigators and the courts' 
reluctance to impose jail sentences than it does to any inherent inade-
quacies in the laws. 
Moreover, in addition to the several above-referred-to statutes and 
ordinances aimed at controlling prostitution and other illicit sexual 
activity, the County has enacted § 15-18-5(3) of the massage ordinance. 
Section 15-18-5(3), not challenged herein, provides as follows: 
10 
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(3) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch or 
of fer to touch or massage the genetalia of 
customerse 
This section of the massage ordinance would provide additional, although 
not necessary, proscription of prostitution and is aimed directly at 
massage parlors.. There is no purpose furthered by § 15-18-5(1) of the 
massage ordinance that is not met by § 15-18-5(3) of the same ordinanceG 
So that, even ignoring the several external statutes and ordinances 
covering the same area, the massage ordinance itself internally makes 
§ 15-18-5(1) totally unnecessary. 
In sum, the existing laws designed to combat prostitution are suffi-
cient to further the County's desire to improve morals, and these laws 
need only to be more effectively enforced and the punishment more effec-
tively administered. Moreover, with the additional proscription of 
illicit sexual activity found in § 15-18-5(3) of the massage ordinance, 
§ 15-18-5(1) is totally unnecessary and its enactment, is thus outside 
the County's delegated scope of authority under § 17-5-77, UCA, and said 
section must be found invalid and unenforceable. 
(ii) SECTION 15-18-5(1) IS AN IMPROPER 
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER. 
In addition to the County's use of the police power in enacting 
§ 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance being unnecessary as discussed 
supra, its use is also improper. 
A case on point is Jensen v. Salt Lake County, supra, wherein an 
earlier version of the Salt Lake County massage ordinance was challenged 
as being an improper exercise of the police power. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in reaching its holding, reasoned as follows: 
11 
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At the trial in the court below a county commissioner and 
a member of the county sheriff's office testified that 
prostitution was the major concern in the adoption of the 
ordinance in question. It is the County's contention 
that it is a valid exercise of police power to regulate 
massage establishments and to control prostitution. We 
are of the opinion that the County does have the power to 
deal with those matters directly. However, the ordinance 
under consideration does neither, but rather it attempts 
to set standards and qualifications of those persons who 
intend to engage in a legitimate occupation or trade. 
This is not a proper exercise of the police power. At 530 
P.2d 4. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court concluded that the County's attempt to indirectly control 
prostitution through a licensing ordinance for massage parlors was an 
improper exericse of the police power, and further concluded that if the 
County wants to control prostitution, it has the power to do so, but it 
must exercise the power "directly." 
The present massage ordinance suffers from the same sort of attempt 
to "indirectly" control prostitution through the licensing, in this case 
suppression and prohibition, of massage parlorse The opposite sex mas-
sage prohibition of § 15-18-5(1), like the high standards and qualifi-
cations demanded of masseurs by the massage ordinance challenged in 
Jensen, supra, is an improper exercise of the police power because the 
County has failed to directly deal with the matter of controlling prosti-
tution and instead has prohibited the acts of a legitimate occupation 
with the intended purpose of having an indirect effect on prostitution. 
In conclusion as to Point I, the County exceeded its delegated 
authority in enacting § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance because said 
section is not for the purpose of regulation but for the purposes of sup-
pression and prohibition, contrary to § 17-5-27, UCA, and because said 
section is neither necessary nor proper, contrary to § 17-5-77, UCA, and 
thus said section must be found invalid and unenforceable. 
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POINT II 
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS INCONSIS-
TENT WITH AND IN CONFLICT WITH COMPREHENSIVE STATE LAWS 
REGULATING CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY IN THAT SAID SECTION, 
COMBINED WITH SECTION 15-8-8, ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CRIMES OF 
ACTS WHICH ARE NOT CRIMES UNDER STATE LAW. 
Section 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance provides that the admin-
istration of a massage by a licensed masseur upon any person of the oppo-
site sex is unlawful and, under § 15-8-8, the off ender is subject to 
penal sanctions. Thus, in effect, the massage ordinance makes an oppo-
site sex massage tantamount to criminal sexual activity. 
In the landmark case of Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Bev-
erly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 494 P.2d 681 (Calif. 
1972), the Supreme Court of California had occasion to review a chal-
lenge to a massage ordinance similar to that involved in the instant 
case. The court examined the municipality's purpose and objective in 
enacting the massage ordinance and concluded: 
• • • the purpose of the ordinance in question was not to 
regulate the operation of massage parlors but was aimed 
at making the task of the police department and sheriff's 
office easier in their fight against prostitution and 
lewd conduct. We are satisfied that the ordinance is a 
regulation of the criminal aspects of sexual conduct. At 
494 P.2d 683-684. (Emphasis added.) 
The Lancaster court, faced with a preemption argument similar to 
that contended for herein, continued its analysis and held: 
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which is a 
regulation of sexual conduct must be held invalid because 
the state has preempted the criminal aspects of sexual 
activity. At 494 P.2d 684. 
The court in Lancaster based its conclusion on two grounds, the 
mo~e broad being that there is no room for a supplementary or complemen-
tary local ordinance where the subject matter of the ordinance has been 
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fully occupied by the State, and the more narrow being that local ordi-
nances in conflict with general state law are void. (See, Lancaster, 
494 P.2d at 682.) 
The Utah rule with respect to preemption appears to be a hybrid of 
the California position announced in Lancaster. In State v. Allred, 430 
P.2d 371, reversed at 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968) (hereinafter "Allred II"), 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the position that local ordinances regu-
lating the same subject matter as state laws are valid so long as the 
two a re harmonious and cons is tent. In this regard, the court stated: 
The mere fact that an act denounced as a crime under the 
ordinance which is not denounced as a crime under the 
statute would not necessarily render the act under the 
ordinance inconsistent with the statute whereas here the 
ordinance is within scope of the state law dealing with 
the same related subject of sexual offenses and is in no 
way repugnant to, but on the other hand is in harmony 
with the state laws. We believe the ordinance is consis-
tent with the statutes pertaining to sex offenses. At 
437 P.2d 436. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the test applied in Allred II, whether the local ordinance is 
"harmonious" and "consistent" with the general state law, is much the 
same as the more narrow of the two grounds which served as the basis for 
the Lancaster court's decision. 
In the same year that the Allred II decision was handed down, the 
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to review another preemption case, ~ 
v. Salt Lake City, 445 P. 2d 691 (Utah 1968). There, the Court refined 
and clarified the holding in Allred II. Still abiding to the harmonious-
conflicting test announced in the prior opinion, the Court defined what 
it meant by "conflict:" 
• • the invalidity arises, not from conflict of 
language, but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdic-
tion which would result from dual regulations covering 
the same ground. Only by such a broad definition of 
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"conflict" is it possible to confine local legislation to 
its proper field of supplementary regulation. At 445 Pc 
2d 694. (Emphasis addede) _ 
In Allgood v. Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme 
Court again defined and somewhat enlarged the preemption test set forth 
in Allred II. There, the Court addressed a Salt Lake City ordinance 
making criminal trespass a Class B misdemeanor and contrasted it with 
general state law which, at § 76-6-206(3) of the Utah Criminal Code, set 
out the same offense as only an infraction, for which no jail sentence 
could be imposed. The defendant, having been convicted under the ordi-
nance and sentenced to jail, sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in upholding the issuance of the Writ, held as follows: 
The District Court ruled "that since the State Law pro-
vides no jail sentence for trespass, which is classified 
as an 'infraction,' that the city cannot impose a greater 
sentence. than that provided by state law, and it is for 
that reason that the Court grants the petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and affirm the 
trial court • • • . Salt Lake City seeks to exceed the 
public policy declared by the legislature relating to a 
new class of offense. It does not have that power of 
amendment. At 545 P.2d 532. (Emphasis added.) 
The most recent Utah case and that completing the second phase of 
the hybrid approach with respect to preemption, Layton City v. Speth, 
578 P. 2d 828 (Utah 1978), appears to adopt the more broad of the two 
grounds set forth in Lancaster. There, the Utah Supreme Court ruled, 
given the State' .s full occupation of the subject matter regulated by the 
challenged ordinance, that the municipality, under its general police 
power, did not even have the authority to copy the statute. In this 
regard, the court stated: 
The State of Utah has enacted statutes controlling the 
sale, gift, or use of controlled substances ••• [t]he 
city has no power or authority to copy the statute in its 
ordinance. At 578 P.2d 829. 
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The Layton City decision, therefore, is grounded on the same basic prin-
ciple announced in Lancaster: that there is no room for a supplementary 
or complementary local ordinance where the subject matter of the ordi-
nance has been fully occupied by the state. Moreover, the court, in 
Layton City, went so far as to say that the municipality could not even 
"copy" the statute. 
First, applying the more narrow approach taken in Allred II, as 
refined in Salt Lake City and Allgood, supra, appellants submit that 
§ 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance must fail as being inconsistent 
and in conflict with general state law. 
As stated earlier in this point, and as the court concluded under 
nearly identical facts in Lancaster, the opposite sex massage pro hi bi-
tion of § 15-18-5(1), although contained within a licensing ordinance, 
is properly characterized as a criminal ordinance regulating sexual 
activity. Criminal sexual activity is comprehensively dealt with in the 
Utah Criminal Code at § 76-5-401 et seq. and at § 76-10-1301 et seq. 
Nowhere therein is the simple act of giving a massage to a person of the 
opposite sex made criminal. Indeed, criminal sexual activity as defined 
in § 76-10-1301, UCA, even under the most tortured interpretation, does 
not include massages: 
"Sexual Activity" means intercourse or any sexual act in-
volving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus 
of ano-ther person, regardless of the sex of either parti-
cipant. 
The issue, under the Allred II test, is whether§ 15-18-5(1), which 
prohibits opposite sex massage as criminal sexual activity, is inconsis-
tent with or in conflict with general state law, which excludes massages 
from the definition of criminal sexual activity. 
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In Allred II, the Utah Supreme Court found no inconsistency between 
general state law proscribing prostitution and the city ordinance, which 
made it an offense to direct or offer to direct any person to any place 
for the purpose of committing any lewd act or act of sexual intercoursee 
The distinction between Allred II and the instant case, however, is 
obvious. In Allred II, both the ordinance and the statutes specific-
ally, directly and consistently dealt with criminal sexual activity as 
defined by state law, whereas in the instant case, the massage ordinance 
deals with opposite sex massages as criminal sexual activity and state 
law makes no mention of massages and does not even include massages 
within the definition of criminal sexual activityo So that under the 
massage ordinance, a new class of offense is created 9 amending general 
state law the exact problem posed in Allgood -- and thus, unlike the 
situation in Allred II, the massage ordinance and state law are inher-
ently contradictory and cannot be harmonized, so that state law must be 
said to preempt § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance. 
Next, applying the most recent and broader approach taken in Layton 
City, § 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance is even more clearly pre-
empted by the comprehensive general state laws regulating criminal 
sexual activity. If the County is without authority to even copy the 
state prostitution laws, it is surely without authority to enact an 
ordinance that is inconsistent with said state laws. 
Additionally, although perhaps not of the precedential value of a 
Utah Supreme Court opinion, further support for appellants' contention 
that § 15-18-5(1) is preempted can be found in Jensen v. Salt Lake 
County, Civil No. 216089 (1974). There, with the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, presiding Judge, the Third Judicial District Court ruled in its 
Memorandum Decision, entered March 19, 1974, that: 
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The evidence indicated that basically the purpose for en-
acting the ordinance was to control prostitution, which 
illegal practice is already covered by the criminal laws 
of the State of Utah, and an attempt to regulate it by 
the above-ref erred-to ordinance would be a contravention 
of the state law. (Emphasis added.) 
The County appealed to the Utah Supreme CourtG (See Jensen v. Salt Lake 
County, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974) .) There, the Court found the massage 
ordinance invalid and unenforceable on grounds of vagueness and improper 
exercise of the police power and, having made that finding, did not have 
occasion to reach the preemption question. Judge Stewart M. Hanson's 
decision, though, was not reversed, and appellants submit that it still 
remains of significance in this Court's determination of the same issue. 
In sum as to Point II, applying any or all of the approaches taken 
in Lancaster, Allred II, Salt Lake City, Allgood, Layton City, or Jensen, 
and given the kind of inconsistency between the massage ordinance and 
state laws regulating criminal sexual activity, the state laws must be 
said to preempt the massage ordinance insofar as the two are in con-
flict, so that § 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordinance must be found 
invalid and unenforceable. 
POINT III 
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT AND UTAH CIVIL 
RIGHTS STATUTES. 
Section 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance, as already stated, pro-
hibits licensed masseurs from performing massages on persons of the oppo-
site sex. Sections 15-18-7 and 15-18-8 provide for civil sanctions, 
such as license suspension and revocation, and penal sanctions, such as 
fines and imprisonment, respectively. Thus, in order to comply with the 
mandate of the massage ordinance and avoid its sanctions, a massage 
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parlor is compelled to hire its male and female employees in proportion 
to the sexual composition of its clientele~ In other words, if all of a 
massage parlor's customers are male, (see, Stipulated Facts, no. 7, "The 
vast majority of massage parlor patrons are men.") then the massage 
parlor must employ only male masseurs, even though female masseurs are 
equally qualified and even though female masseurs outnumber their male 
counterparts thirteen to one (~, Stipulated Facts, no. 6, "There are 
approximately 140 licensed masseurs in Salt Lake County; of this 
number, approximately 130 are women.") Not only does the massage ordi-
nance require an impossibility a mere ten licensed male masseurs 
cannot meet the employment needs of all the massage establishments --but 
appellants submit that it requires a violation of the Utah Antidiscrimi-
nation Act. A massage parlor must hire its employees not on the basis 
of their respective qualifications but on the sole basis of their sex. 
Specifically, any massage parlor that adheres to the mandate of the 
massage ordinance violates § 34-35-6, UCA, of the Utah Antidiscrimina-
tion Act, which states in relevant part as follows: 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice: 
(a) For an employer to refuse to hire • • • be-
cause of ••• sex . (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, the Salt Lake County Commissioners, in enacting the 
discriminatory ordinance, have violated the same section of the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act, at part (e), which states as follows: 
( e) For any person, whether an employer, an employment 
agency, a labor organization, or employees or 
members thereof, to aid, abet, incite, compel or 
otherwise coerce the doing of an act defined in this 
section to be a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice or to obstruct or prevent any person from 
complying with the provisions of this chapter •••• 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Thus, in order for a massage parlor to remain in business and in 
compliance with the massage ordinance, it must consciously and openly 
discriminate on the basis of sex in employment, thereby violating § 34-
35-6(1) of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. Moreover, the massage ordi-
nance that compels such a discriminatory employment practice and pre-
vents employers from complying with the terms of the Utah Antidiscrimina-
tion Act is itself in violation of § 34-35-6(1) (e) of the same Act. 
The respondents may very well contend that, given the massage ordi-
nance's prohibition of opposite sex massages, sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for massage parlors and, therefore, within an excep-
tion of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act found at§ 34-35-6(2)(a). Such 
reasoning, however, is circular and without merit in that it presumes 
the ordinance valid, and once valid, the occupational qualification bona 
fide, and once the· occupational qualification bona fide, the ordinance 
creating it valid, and so on. The questions as to the validity of the 
ordinance and the bona fide-ness of the occupational qualification are 
separate and involve different considerations. 
Section 34-35-6(2)(a) states the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exception as follows: 
(2) It shall not be a discriminatory or unfair practice: 
(a) For an employer to hire and employ employees on 
the basis of • • • sex • • • where • • • sex is 
a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal business or enter-
prise or essential to the motif, culture or at-
mosphere displayed, illustrated or promoted by 
such particular business or enterprise. (Empha-
sis added.) 
In the instant case, it is not "normal" for a massage parlor to 
hire male masseurs merely because its customers are male, nor it is 
"essential" to the "atmosphere" that male masseurs perform massages on 
persons of the male gender. Indeed, such Practices wn11l ti h~ M'\.-n+- ........ y to 
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the present operation of massage parlors in Salt Lake County, most of 
which administer massages without regard to sex. Thus sex, as an occu-
pational qualification, in this instance, is invalid -- not bona fide --
and the massage ordinance must be struck down as violative of the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act. 
Moreover, not only would a massage parlor be required to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex in employment in order to comply with the 
massage ordinance, it would also have to discriminate on the basis of 
sex in rendering services. For example, if a massage parlor had only 
female masseurs in its employ, or only female masseurs on duty, the 
business would be forced to deny its services to male customers. Such a 
denial of services on the basis of sex is a violation of Utah's civil 
rights statutes, of which § 13-7-3, UCA, states in relevant part as 
follows: 
Equal right in business establishments, places of public 
accommodation, and enterprises regulated by the state. --
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are 
free and equal and are entitled to full and equal accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and 
services in all business establishments and in all places 
of public accommodation, and by all enterprises regu-
lated by the state of every kind whatsoever, without 
discrimination on the basis of • • . sex • . . • (Empha-
sis added.) 
The case of Cianciolo v. City Council of Knoxville, 376 F.Supp. 719 
(D.C. Tenn. 1974), is on point. There, the court examined a massage 
ordinance similar to that in the instant case under the federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which Act served as the model for Utah's civil 
rights statutes. The court found that sex was not a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification and further concluded that: 
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The [massage] ordinance • • • fails to recognize that not 
all female masseuses will abuse a historically legitimate 
occupation when permitted to massage clients of the oppo-
site sex • • • • The infirmity is that this presump-
tion is grounded on an individual's sex. In conclusion, 
it would appear that [the ordinance] does not comply with 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. At 376 F.Supp. 723. (Emphasis added.) 
Just as the massage ordinance was invalid as violative of the federal 
Civil Rights Act in Cianciolo, the massage ordinance challenged in the 
instant case is also invalid as violative of Utah's civil rights stat-
utes. 
In conclusion as to Point III, § 15-18-5 ( 1) of the massage ordi-
nance, which creates discriminatory qualifications regarding employment 
and rendering of services, must be found invalid and unenforceable in 
violation of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act and the Utah civil rights 
statutes. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE DENIES EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The appellants, in asserting Point IV, acknowledge the cases of 
Smith v. Keater, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 42 L.Ed.2d 636 (1974); 
Rubenstein v. Township of Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963, 94 S.Ct. 3165, 41 
L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974); and Kisley v. City Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, 93 
S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed.2d 169 (1972), appeals from state court decisions 
upholding the federal constitutionality of massage ordinances similar to 
the massage ordinance in the instant case, in which the United States 
Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The 
appellants further acknowledge that under Hicks v. Miranda, 4 22 U.S. 
332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), the United States Supreme 
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Court's dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion is to be treated as dispositive on the merits of the issues raised. 
The appellants, however, respectfully submit that the United States 
Supreme Court's decisions in the above-cited massage ordinance cases are 
in error. Realizing that this Court is not the proper forum for seeking 
a reversal of the United States Supreme Court as to that Court's inter-
pretation of the United States Constitution (see, Oregon v. Haas, 420 
U .. S. 714, at- 719, f.n. 4, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.,2d 570 (1975)), the 
appellants, for purposes of preserving the issues raised for appeal 
only, briefly set forth the points of contention as follows: 
(1) That § 15-18-5(1) creates a sex-based classification without a 
compelling state interest therefor, contrary to the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
(2) That § 15-18-5(1-) creates a sex-based classification without a 
reasonable basis therefor, contrary to the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
(3) That § 15-18-5(1) creates a classification in the exercise of 
the fundamental right to pursue a legitimate occupation in-
cluding licensed masseurs and excluding licensed persons who 
practice the healing arts or professions, contrary to the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
(4) That § - 15-18-5 (1) creates an arbitrary and irrational classi-
fication including licensed masseurs and excluding licensed 
persons who practice the healing arts or professions; 
(5) That § 15-18-5(1) abridges the fundamental right to pursue a 
legitimate occupation without a compelling state interest 
therefor, contrary to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; 
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(6) That there are less restrictive means of achieving the same 
objective sought by § 15-18-5(1) and the failure to use such 
means is a denial of due process, contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and 
(7) That § 15-18-5 (1) creates an irrebuttable presumption that 
persons massaging persons of the opposite sex will engage in 
" illicit sexual activity and such presumption is irrational and 
denies due process, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
POINT V 
SECTION 15-18-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE DENIES EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND PUNISHES PERSONS 
WITHOUT TRIAL OR CONVICTION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The appellants contend that, while in some instances the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution 
may be helpful to state courts in interpreting their own constitutions, 
the former in no way binds the latter. (See, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 
714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); City and County of Denver v. 
Nielson, 572 P.2d 485 (Colo. 1977).) The appellants submit that this is 
especially true where, as in the instant case, the language of the two 
constitutions differs significantly. 
Unlike the United States Constitution which, absent the Equal 
Rights amendment, has no constitutional laugage raising sex-based classi-
fications to the level of "strict scrutiny," the Constitution of the 
State of Utah does have such lang~age. Specifically, Article IV, Sec-
tion I provides in relevant part as follows: 
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• e Q Both male and female citizens of this State shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights 
and privileges., 
Given this constitutional protection of sexual equality, any state intru-
sion upon equality of the sexes should be subjected to strict scrutiny, 
with the burden on the state to show a compelling state interest fur-
thered by such intrusion. 
The application of the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest 
test in matters involving sex-based classifications, such as that pre-
sented by § 15-18-5(1), is consistent with and mandated by the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Beehive Med. Electronics v. Industrial Com-
mission, 583 P. 2d 53 (Utah 1978). There, the Court characterized the 
protection against discrimination based on sex founded in the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah, Article IV, Section I, as a "precious right 
in our basic law." At 583 Po 2d 60 o As such a ".precious right," any 
abridgements thereof should undergo the Court's most careful scrutiny, 
with only those abridgements of a legitimate and compelling nature 
surviving. 
Additionally, as § 15-18-5(1) creates a classification in the exer-
cise of the fundamental right to pursue a legitimate occupation which 
includes licensed masseurs and which also includes licensed persons who 
practice the healing arts or professions, and further as said section 
suppresses and prohibits the fundamental right to pursue the commercial 
enterprise of administering massages, a legitimate occupation, the 
strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test is mandated by the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24. 
The strict scrutiny-compelling state interest analysis has been 
applied in several cases involving classifications based on sex. (See, 
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Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201 (Texas 1976); Long v. Cali-
fornia State Personnel Board, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Calif. 1974); Daugh-
erty v. Daley, 370 F.Supp. 338 (D.C. Ill. 1974); Johnston v. Hodges, 
372 F.Supp. 1015 (D.C. Ky. 1974); U.S. v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 
(D.C. Mont. 1975); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Asso-
ciation, 377 F.Supp. 1233 (D.C. Kan. 1974); M. v. M., 321 A.2d 115 
(Del. 1974); Anderson v. City of Detroit, 221 N.W.2d 168 (Mich. 1974); 
Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975); and Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. 
Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).) 
Directly on point are several cases involving massage ordinances 
nearly identical to that in the instant case, where the strict scrutiny-
compelling state interest test has been applied with the universal 
result that the ordinances were found unconstitutional. 
In Cianciolo v. City of Knoxville, supra, the court held: 
As the commercial enterprise of administering massages 
is, per se, a legitimate occupation, the city in this in-
stance must show a compelling state interest before this 
ordinance. can be upheld • . • • It is settled law that 
before a regulation can withstand judicial examination 
under the compelling state interest, the state must show 
that there was no alternative method of achieving the ob-
jective sought • • • • It appears that in this instance 
there is available to the City viable, existing alterna-
tive methods of curtailing sexually illicit conduct --
alternatives that place a less onerous burden on those 
who practice [massages] • • (Emphasis added.) 
In Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F.Supp. 977 (D.C. Texas 1972), re-
versed on the issue of standing at 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974), the 
court held: 
This court concludes that Corey has a fundamental right 
to operate a massage establishment in the City of Dallas. 
Any ordinance which infringes on Corey's right to do 
business through a classification based on sex which re-
stricts who Corey may employ in his business contravenes 
the Fourteenth Amendment unless the objective of the or-
dinance is supported by a compelling state interest. • • • 
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This court finds that there are practicable alternative 
methods available to the City of Dallas which would 
achieve the same ~bjective of this ordinance. Therefore, 
the objective of this statutory classification based on 
sex is not supported by a compelling state interest. 
At 352 F.Supp. 981 and 983. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, the County cannot meet the demanding burden of 
the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test. The admitted pur-
pose of § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance is to reach the criminal 
offense of prostitution and, since there are several other existing 
alternative methods available to the defendants, such as the several 
statutes and ordinances outlawing prostitution and illicit sexual acti-
vity (~, Point I-B (i)), the interest furthered by the ordinance is 
duplicative and in no manner compelling. 
Even if the lesser standard of the "rational basis" test is applied 
to the massage ordinance in question, it would fail as unnecessary, irra-
tional and creating an irrebuttable presumption. In J.S.K. Enterprises, 
Inc. v. City of Lacey, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1971), the court applied the 
rational basis test to a massage ordinance very similar to that in the 
instant case and held: 
Massage is one of the oldest forms of therapy. When pro-
perly administered in an appropriate case, it can be one 
of the most useful forms of therapy. To deny all rnassag-
ists the right to practice their profession because some 
individuals utilize a massage parlor as a subterfuge to 
perform lewd acts for compensation would require stereo-
typing of the worst kind. It is saying, in effect, that 
all massagists can be judged to be lewd if given the op-
portunity and therefore they cannot massage members of 
the opposite sex. Not only is this discrimination as to 
both sexes of massagists but it would deny the people who 
need their services the opportunity to select the best 
qualified massagist available to them • • • • We there-
fore hold that the ordinance is an unreasonable and arbi-
trary exercise of the police power. At 492 P.2d 607. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Similarly, in City and County of Denver v. Nielson, supra, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado, addressing itself to the constitutionality of 
a massage ordinance nearly identical to that in the instant case, ap-
plied the rational basis test under the Colorado Constitution and held: 
The Denver ordinance is not a reasonable regulation. ..!!_ 
creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, and unconstitutional 
conclusive presumption. • • • The ordinance is unduly 
oppressive to legitimate massage practitioners and goes 
beyond the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the 
legitimate objective of preventing illicit sexual 
behavior. Alternative constitutionally permissible 
methods of curtailing sexually illicit behavior are 
available to legislative bodies. At 572 P.2d 486. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the instant case, the massage ordinance should fail for the same 
reasons articulated in the above-cited cases. The manner in which the 
massage ordinance attempts to regulate illicit sexual activity is unrea-
sonable and unnecessary given the available alternatives and further it 
creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, irrebuttable presumption that all 
masseurs will commit illegal sexual acts but for the prohibition to the 
contrary. 
Speaking to the issue of the creation of irrebuttable presumptions, 
then-Justice Ellett, writing a concurring opinion in Jensen v. Salt 
Lake County, supra, summarized the Court's findings as follows: 
The requirements of the [massage] ordinance in my 
opinion are too severe to be considered reasonable 
requirements for a license to operate as a masseuse. 
There surely are masseuses who are moral women. At 
530 P.2d 4. (Emphasis added.) 
The appellan1:s, echoing the words of Justice Ellett, submit that 
there are masseuses who are moral women, and further submit that any 
massage ordinance which conclusively and irrebuttably presumes that all 
masseuses are immoral is violative of the Utah Constitution. 
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In addition to the above constitutional analyses, the most recent 
Utah Supreme Court case on massage ordinances, Hart Heal th Studio v. 
Salt Lake County, supra, provides a constitutional ruling that, appel-
lants submit, is controlling in the instant casee There, the Utah 
Supreme Court was presented with an earlier version of the Salt Lake 
County massage ordinance, which provided in part for an annual license 
fee of $5,000.00 for any massage parlor employing a masseur whose 
massage parlor license had been revoked within the past 12 months. The 
Court, in examining this provision, stated: 
We also believe this section of the ordinance is 
somewhat like the old bills of pains and penal ties 
(special acts of a legislature which inflict punish-
ment on persons without any conviction by the ordi-
nary course of judicial proceedings), prohibited by 
the Utah and U.S. Constitutions (see, Article I, Sec-
tion 18, Utah Constitution; and Article I, Section 
10, U.S. Constitution.) The ordinance clearly penal-
izes the masseur and his employer without a trial or 
conviction, and thus is clearly invalid and unen-
forceable under the constitutional provisions cited. 
At 577 P.2d 118. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, a type of punishment without trial or convic-
tion, on a somewhat larger scale than that in Hart Health Studio, is 
presented by the massage ordinance in question. Given the conclusive 
presumption that all masseurs administering opposite sex massages will 
engage in illicit sexual activity, but for the prohibition against oppo-
site sex massages, all masseurs are being conclusively presumed guilty 
and punished without trial or conviction. Whereas in Hart, the punish-
ment was an annual license fee of $5,000.00, in the instant case, the 
punishment is being driven out of business., Such punishment without 
trial or conviction is contrary to Article I, Section 18 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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In conclusion as to Point V, § 15-18-5(1) of the massage ordinance 
must fail under either or both of the strict scrutiny-compelling state 
interest test and the rational basis test under the due process and 
equal protection requirements of Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24 of the 
Utah Constitution, and further must fail as establishing punishment 
without a trial or conviction under Article I, Section 18 of the Utah 
Cons ti tu tion. 
POINT VI 
SECTION 15-18-3 OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE CREATES AN 
ARBITRARY AND IRRATIONAL CLASSIFICATION ON THE BASIS OF 
AGE IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2 AND 24 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Section 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance provides that an applicant 
for a masseur's license must be at least 21 years of age. The appel-
lants contend that there is no rational basis in support of such a class-
if ication. 
The respondents suggest that there are two reasons for the classifi-
cation set forth in § 15-18-3: because "a 17-year-old girl was arrested 
in a Massage Parlor, acting as a masseuse, unlicensed," (see, Stipulated 
Facts); and because persons under the age of 21 generally lack the 
necessary experience and maturity to conduct the business of a masseur 
(see, Defendants' Trial Memorandum, Point VII). 
As to the concern of "17-year-old girls" acting as masseuses, the 
problem associated therewith would be alleviated by setting the age 
requirement at 18 years. The apparent concern is that runaways will 
turn to massage parlors for employment unless the age requirement is set 
at 21 years, but this ignores the fact that 18 years of age is the age 
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of majority in the State of Utah. (See, § 15~2-1 9 UCA, "the period of 
minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years.") 
Once an individual obtains the age of majority~ he cannot legally be 
considered a runaway; thus the age requirement need only be set at 18 
years to resolve this problem. 
Next, the contention that an individual must be 21 years of age in 
order to ''handle" the responsibilities of a masseur is totally without 
merit. The State of Utah regulates the licensing of nurses whose respon-
sibilities are far more substantial than those of a masseur and no age 
requirement is provided for. (See, § 58-31-9, UCA, "Registered Nurses 
-- Requirements for license," and § 58-31-10, UCA, "Practical Nurses --
Requirements for license.") Many nurses are licensed every year between 
the ages of 18 and 21 years; and if they are able to assume their 
responsibilities at that age, then there is no reason to require more of 
masseurs .. 
The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court, by 
which classifications based on age are judged, is the rational basis 
test. (See, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
at 314 (1976); ~' contra, Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005 (1976), which 
case applies the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest analysis.) 
Similarly, the Utah courts have applied the rational basis standard to 
classifications which treat one group of persons different from another 
group. (See, Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976); 
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975); Leatham v. 
McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah 
1974), appeal dismissed 95 S.Ct. 24, 419 U .. S. 810, 42 L .. Ed.2d 37, reh. 
denied 95 S.Ct. 645, 419 U.S. 1050, 42 L.Ed.2d 658 (1975).) 
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In the instant case, respondents contend that two bases serve for 
the age classification presented by § 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance: 
the concern for runaway minors and the concern that a person must be 21 
years of age to handle the responsibilities of a masseur. The appel-
lants submit, as stated earlier in this Point, that neither basis is 
rationally related to the County's purpose·, as 18-year-olds are not 
minors and, as persons between the ages of 18 years and 20 years, are 
capable of assuming the responsibilities of a masseur. 
In conclusion as to Point VI, § 15-18-3 of the massage ordinance 
creates an arbitrary and unreasonable classification on the basis of 
age, not rationally related to the County's purpose, in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT VII 
SECTIONS 15-18-1(2), 15-18-1(4), AND 15-18-4 OF THE 
MASSAGE ORDINANCE. ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND 
UNCERTAIN. 
Sections 15-18-1 (2), 15-18-1 (4), and 15-18-4 fail to give adequate 
notice of what is necessary in order to comply with the requirements of 
the massage ordinance. 
In Jensen v. Salt Lake County, supra, similar contentions as to 
vagueness were raised and the Court set the test as follows: 
The trial court was of the opinion that the language of 
the ordinance was to vague and uncertain as to render it 
invalid. We conclude that that determination by the 
trial court was correct. A person who might wish to en-
ter the field covered by the ordinance would be unable to 
determine from its wording what qualification or skill 
would be necessary to qualify for a license. It is noted 
that the ordinance uses the term "massage therapist" but 
nowhere is that term defined. At 530 P.2d 4. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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In the instant case, § 15-18-1(2) of the massage ordinance uses the 
term "healing arts" but nowhere is that term defined.. This presents 
much the same problem as that presented by the undefined tenn, nmassage 
therapist," since the person who might wish to enter the field of heal-
ing arts instead of that of a masseur has no idea of what the ordinance 
has in mind.. For the same reasons stated in Jensen, § 15-18-1 (2) is so 
vague and uncertain as to render that section invalid. 
Section 15-18-1(4) of the massage ordinance is similarly troubled 
by the use of uncertain terminology. Section 15-18-1(4) provides the 
definition of "employee" and proceeds to define it as meaning, among 
other things, "owner" and "manager." It is confusing as to how one can 
be both the owner and the employee at the same time. Such a definition 
is contrary to common usage and, as such, the ordinary person is unable 
to determine who is considered an employee and who is not.. Thus, § 15-
18-1(4) is so uncertain as to render it invalid .. 
Additionally, § 15-18-4 sets standards so vague as to be outside 
the ordinary person's ability to determine what is required for compli-
ance with the massage ordinance. Section 15-18-4 provides the require-
ment that the premises of massage parlors must be "sanitary," but does 
so in such vague terms that an applicant is not put on notice as to what 
is required. Section 15-18-4 states in relevant part as follows: 
• a license shall be granted only after a finding by 
the Salt Lake City-County Baord of Health that the pro-
posed premises are sanitary enough to conduct business 
therein without jeopardizing the public health.. (Empha-
sis added.) 
No standards are specified so as to give an applicant any indica-
tion of what is meant by "sanitary enough. n Without more specificity, 
the ordinary person is unable to determine what requirements must be 
33 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
met, and thus, under Jensen, § 15-18-4 of the massage ordinance is ren-
dered invalid. 
Problems of vagueness, similar to those in the instant case, arose 
in New York State Society of Medical Masseurs, Inc., et al. v. City of 
New York, et al., 74 Misc.2d 573 (N.Y. 1973), wherein the court had occa-
sion to review New York City's massage parlor ordinance. There, faced 
with the wording "may license massage ins ti tu tes upon receipt of appro-
val from all necessary governmental agencies having jurisdiction," the 
court ruled: 
• the very failure to set standards for the enforce-
ment of the statute (citations omitted) makes the statute 
susceptible of discriminatory enforcement and therefore 
void on its face. At 870. 
The court further stated: 
It is not necessary to prove that this broad statute is 
likely to be enforced in a manner to harass persons who 
are not intended to fall under its structures. It is 
sufficient if 'the broad prohibitive language of the 
statute together with the lack of any defined standards 
for judging violations renders it peculiarly susceptible 
to arbitrary enforcement' (citations omitted). At 870. 
In the instant case, the massage ordinance in question presents 
similar broad language with no defined standards for judging violations. 
The appellants submit that this absence of defined standards will allow 
and promote arbitrary enforcement of the provisions of the massage ordi-
nance. 
In sum as to Point VII, § § 15-18-1 (2), 15-18-1 (4), and 15-18-4 of 
the massage ordinance are so vague and uncertain that they fail to 
impart adequate notice of what requirements must be met in order for 
compliance, and said sections must be found invalid and unenforceable. 
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POINT VIII 
SECTIONS 15-18-5(1) AND 15-18-8 PROVIDE FOR INCHOATE 
OFFENSES IN CONFLICT WITH GENERAL STATE LAWS SETTING 
FORTH INCHOATE OFFENSESe 
Section 15-18-5(1) provides in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any massage establishment 
to cause or permit in or about his place of busi-
ness, an employee to administer a massage upon any 
person of the opposite sex. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 15-18-8 additionally sets forth penal sanctions for persons con-
victed of violations of the massage ordinance, including violations of 
the above-stated § 15-18-5(1). 
Since it is the combined effect of the two sections to make an 
owner of a massage parlor criminally liable for the acts of his employ-
ees, even though the owner does nothing more than "permit" employees to 
engage in prohibited acts, the two sections are in conflict with general 
state criminal laws setting forth the inchoate offense of conspiracye 
Under the Utah Criminal Code, at § 76-4-201, UCA, the elements of 
conspiracy are set out as follows: 
••• a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending 
that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the per-
mance of such conduct and any one of them commits an 
overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. . .• 
Two of these necessary elements for the crime of conspiracy are circum-
vented by the massage ordinance's use of the word "permit." Permit is 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary as ". • • to acquiesce, by failure to 
prevent," and, therefore, one can perriit certain acts to take place with-
out either "intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed" or 
"agreeing" with someone "to cause the performance of such conduct." 
In conclusion as to Point VIII, appellants submit that Salt Lake 
County's enactment of § § 15-18-5 (1) and 15-18-8, which make a massage 
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parlor owner vicariously liable for the acts of his employees, in effect 
establishes the crime of conspiring to commit prohibited acts under the 
massage ordinance. The appellants further submit that §§ 15-18-5(1) and 
15-18-8 are inherently contradictory to general state conspiracy laws 
and, under the rationale advanced in Point II, supra, said sections must 
be found to be preempted by state law and, to the extent preempted, 
invalid and unenforceable. 
POINT IX 
SECTION 15-18-5(2) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS PREEMPTED 
BY STATE LIQUOR LAWS AND MUST BE FOUND INVALID AND UNEN-
FORCEABLE. 
Section 15-18-5 (2) purports to regulate serving, storing and con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages on premises of massage parlors. As the 
respondents have conceded (~, Defendants' Memorandum Point VI), said 
section is preempted by the comprehensive state liquor laws set out at 
Title 32, Chapters 1 through 10, UCA, under the rationale advanced in 
Point II, supra. 
More specifically, the State Liquor Control Act makes provision for 
"State stores," at § 32-1-36; "Sale and delivery of liquor to indivi-
duals," at § 32-1-39; ''Manufacture, importation and sale," at § 32-4-
11; "Consumption on premises," at § 32-4-19; "Prohibited sale of alco-
holic beverages," at § 32-7-1; "Possession of liquor," at § 32-7-2; 
"Supply of liquor to prohibited persons," at § 32-7-13; and "Having 
liquor without permit," at § 32-7-25. The appellants submit that the 
Liquor Control Act comprehensively deals with intoxicating liquor and 
nowhere therein makes it unlawful for a business to possess and consume 
liquor on its premises; selling, yes, but not mere possession and con-
sumption. 
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Section 15-18-5(2) of the massage ordinance in no manner addresses 
the sale of alcoholic beverages; instead it outlaws the "serving," 
"storing," and "consumption" of alcoholic beverages on the premises of 
massage parlors. Further, respondents have made no contention that 
massage parlors have in the past or will in the future "sell" alcoholic 
beverages .. 
The appellants submit that § 15-18-5(2) attempts to create a new 
class of offenses, the mere serving, storage or consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, and that such is inconsistent to and conflicting with the 
offenses set forth by comprehensive state law. The appellants further 
submit that under the authorities of Lancaster, supra, Allred II, supra, 
Salt Lake City, supra, Allgood, supra, and Layton City, supra, and the 
rationale set forth in Point II, supra, said section is preempted and 
invalid., 
Further support for appellants' contention, and dealing more 
directly with the subject of intoxicating liquor, is the case of Salt 
Lake County v. Liquor Control Commission, 357 P.2d 488 (Utah 1960). 
There, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a Salt Lake County ordinance in 
conflict with the comprehensive state liquor laws set out in the Liquor 
Control Act and reasoned: 
a county zoning ordinance in and of itself should 
not be permitted to interdict against such sweeping 
authority [Liquor Control Commission's], without a fur-
ther and clear showing that the state's police power is 
being abused and exercised in an unreasonable manner. At 
490. 
The Court, not finding any showing of abuse of the state's police power, 
held: 
We conclude, therefore, that the local county arms of the 
state sovereign must yield to the statewide arm • • 
At 490~ 
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In conclusion as to Point IX, appellants submit that § 15-18-5(2) 
of the massage ordinance is inconsistent and in conflict with general 
state liquor laws and, therefore, invalid and unenforceable as being 
preempted thereby e The appellants further submit, as respondents con-
ceded to this point at trial and advanced no authorities to the 
contrary, that the lower court's ruling is unsupported by the record on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the several reasons advanced above in Points I through IX, 
appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the Memorandum. 
Decision of the lower court, to grant appellants' motion for summary 
judgment, to find §§ 15-18-1(2), 15-18-1(4), 15-18-3, 15-18-4, 15-18-
5(1), 15-18-5(2), 15-18-7, and 15-18-8 of the massage ordinance unlawful 
and unconstitutional, and to issue a permanent injunction enjoining 
respondents from enforcing said sections. 
DATED this thirty-first day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<lli -rbd \ (l_~L_/ 
-- <-· 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
HANSEN & HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT L. STOLEBARGER 
BLAISDELL, STOLEBARGER & DAVIS 
Ten Exchange Place, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were served on Theodore L. Cannon, Salt Lake County Attorney, 
attorney for respondents, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, this ~tr day of March, 1980. 
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